Showing posts with label history. Show all posts
Showing posts with label history. Show all posts

Monday, March 8, 2010

Brief: Do trust levels predict sexual activity among the young?

I'm becoming more convinced that the decline in trust levels during the late 1980s may have a lot to do with the decline starting a few years later in all sorts of risky behavior. The logic is simple: the more (or less) trusting you are of others, the more (or less) risk you're willing to take in social life, and also exploiters will have a more (or less) easy time finding "suckers." We looked before at homicide rates. Now let's turn to sexual activity among young people.

For trust levels, I use the General Social Survey's question on whether you think others can be trusted, and restricted respondents to those from 18 to 25 years old. The GSS doesn't survey minors, so I used this age range for "young people." The time series for trust doesn't seem to vary wildly based on which age range you restrict it to, so it seems OK to use trust levels among young adults as a proxy for trust levels among adolescents. For risky sexual activity, I use the pregnancy rate among females ages 15 to 17 (here), which are yearly from 1972 to 2006; and the percent of high schoolers who have had sex before age 13 (here), which are bi-yearly from 1991 to 2007. The trust data are from 1972 to 2008, and coverage is usually bi-yearly or more frequent.

Here are the results. Trust levels are in blue and sexual activity measures in red.



Although the relationship is not perfect, there's a close match overall, and the timing looks like the trust level changes first, followed by a change in sexual activity. That fits with trust being the cause and risky behavior the effect. The correlation across years between trust and the pregnancy rate is +0.47, and between trust and the early sex rate it is +0.44. The Youth Risk Behavior Survey that I got the early sex rate data from has three other measures of teenage sexual activity, and the relationships are similar but not quite as strong.

The correlations with trust are: +0.15 for percent of high schoolers who'd had sex at least once in the past 3 months; +0.21 for the percent who've had 4+ partners in their life; and +0.23 for the percent who've ever had sex. * I also created an index of young sexual activity, which is just the sum of the fraction of students responding positively to each of the 4 questions. This is the expected number of "yes" answers that a high schooler would give while reading off the check-list of risky sex behaviors. The correlation between this index and trust is +0.25.

In general, I think these correlations are weaker just because there are fewer data -- 1991 to 2007, every other year -- than in the case of pregnancy rates. I suspect that the pre-1991 picture for the 4 behaviors surveyed in the YRBS would have looked highly similar to the teen pregnancy rate, so if we had those data, they would probably make the pattern even stronger. In any case, it seems clear that, while not the entire story, how trusting people are of one another plays a substantial role in how willing young people are to engage in risky sexual behavior. That's not too surprising if we think of trust as a form of insurance, but it's still something that's been completely overlooked as far as I know from the social science lit on these two topics that have previously been studied independently of each other.

If I can find good data on cross-national differences in number of lifetime sex partners, or other measure of promiscuity, I might use the national trust level data from the World Values Survey and turn this into a fuller post. It depends on how easy the former data are to get. Informally, though, my impression is that the low-trust countries are more sexually conservative, while the high-trust ones are more sexually liberal.

* The sexual activity correlations paired the sex activity variable and trust variable for the same year if possible (for 1991 and 1993), but since the data use different sets of alternate years after that, I paired the sex variable in a certain year with the trust variable in the following year.

GSS variables used: trust, age, year

Monday, March 1, 2010

Brief: Trust and crime

I've been thinking more about trust and its effects on all areas of social interaction and culture. It's at the root, really: if you don't trust others, you will try to get by on your own. Sociability requires a certain level of trust, and in a social species like ours there are gains to be had by interacting with others -- especially in a modern market economy where you can outsource so many things to others in the market instead of doing them yourself. You don't make your own shoes, grow your own food, manufacture your own computer, or gather your own news about the President. Sounds great -- why would you possibly withdraw from that sociability?

If you trust others, you're making yourself vulnerable to exploitation. The more trusting people there are in a population, the easier it will be for exploiters to thrive, and that will drive up their numbers. The exploiters may become so numerous, and their effects so offensive, that people start to withhold their trust lest they become the next statistic. That state-of-mind could show up in behavior by simply not venturing out into the public sphere where they'd be vulnerable, hiding out in the safer personal sphere.

But then when there are far fewer trusting people, that dries up the resource that exploiters had been thriving on. Now there are lots of them competing to exploit a shrinking number of trusting people. So that will drive down the numbers of exploiters. Eventually people will realize how safe things have become and extend their trust once again, which will in turn drive up the numbers of exploiters as before, and the cycle repeats.

This variant on a model of how hosts and parasites, or predators and prey, interact in ecology suggests looking at data on how trusting people have been over time, and what the crime rate has been like. Before I showed that people rationally respond to changes in the homicide rate by becoming more afraid when it's going up and less afraid when it declines, with about a 2-year lag. So we know that perceptions are affected by crime levels -- but could crime levels be affected by perceptions, i.e. how trustworthy you think other people are?

The General Social Survey asks respondents whether other people can be trusted, cannot be trusted, or that it depends. Here is a plot over time of the percent of respondents who said that other people can be trusted (in black), together with the homicide rate (in red):


Clearly the relationship is less stark than it was for fear resonding to crime, where the correlation within a year was +0.74. Still, the correlation here is +0.53, meaning that indeed higher crime rates are associated with higher levels of trust. And as in the case of fear and crime, that understates the strength of the relationship since there is a time lag. In particular, trust levels started falling steadily before the homicide rate did so. So the predicted relationship is there: crime rates are high throughout the '70s and '80s, and at some point in the mid-late-'80s, people have had enough and start trusting others less and less. With far fewer trusting people to exploit, criminals start scaling back or dying off: the homicide rate peaks in 1991 and starts falling steadily afterward.

We will have to wait a few more decades to see if the rest of the story pans out -- whether with such low crime rates, people will assume it's safe to start trusting people again, and whether those higher levels of trust (if they did happen) would be followed by a rise in the crime rate.

Criminologists and others debate what causes crime to go up or down -- tougher or more lenient punishment by the government, technology that makes it easier or harder to report crimes, etc. I have only a passing familiarity with the range of causes they discuss, but as far as I know, how trusting the average person is does not get much attention, although there may be some minority contingent that does look at it. Perhaps it is as simple as a rise in crime following an increase in the number of people who criminals would consider "suckers," and a decline in crime following a contraction in the numbers of "suckers," just as we see between a host species and a parasite species. The logic is hard to argue against, and the graph above shows that it has some modest empirical support as well.

GSS variables used: trust, year

Monday, January 18, 2010

Brief: More on measuring how aesthetic the zeitgeist has been over time

Returning to a previous attempt to measure how aesthetically minded people have been over time by using diversity in baby names, let's see if the frequency of relevant words in the newspaper of record agrees. I searched the NYT for "aesthetic" and "beautiful" back to 1852, and here are the results:






"Aesthetic" trends upward from the beginning through the early 1910's -- only some of which may have to do with Aestheticism in the arts -- and then declines until the mid-1940's, after which there is a gradual rise through the mid-1990's, and then an explosion from then until the present. "Beautiful" shows a pretty similar history, except for an initial decline during the 1850s (although the number of articles is much smaller in the beginning). It also has two apparent upward shocks: one in mid-1920's -- perhaps reflecting the 1925 world's fair in Paris that popularized Art Deco? -- and the other in the late 1970's. In the graph with moving averages, you can see how similar their trajectories have been. (They are also similar after 2000, but I left that stage out in order to better highlight the ups and downs in "aesthetic," which are hard to see against the recent explosion.)

They also agree well with the movements in the baby name diversity graph. Those data only go back to 1880, but there too we saw a rise from 1880 through the early 1910's, a slump through the mid-1940's, a moderate increase from then until the late 1980's, when it shot up even faster.

After the dizzying changes of industrialization during the latter half of the 19th C., and especially with the outbreak of WWI, many in the West became disillusioned with embracing global interconnectedness and cultural dynamism. Roughly from WWI through WWII, we became more inward-looking and focused on normalcy. We left that behind after winning WWII somewhat restored our faith in global relations and cultural change, and even more so during the most recent era of increased globalization.

There really does seem to be something about a cosmopolitan zeitgeist that makes people more concerned with aesthetic matters -- and clearly not just because the artists can now find mercantile patrons. It's not as though America in the Roaring Twenties wanted for wealthy donors. And a cynic would say that when the culture is becoming more cosmopolitan, status-seekers will try to one-up each other by showing off just how diverse their tastes are.

But I think it's more due to encountering new and exciting things from those other groups you're doing business with. And not only those across the world, but even from strange parts of your own country. Besides, it's not as if rich status-seekers are driving those trends in baby name diversity -- they're too small to count in data taken from social security cardholders. Ordinary people too get swept up in the age of aesthetics, as Virginia Postrel documents in The Substance of Style. To follow her most provocative example, Wal-Mart's website offers about five different streamlined styles of toilet brushes and as many different styles of toiletpaper holders. Wal-Mart shoppers are far below the elite in rank, and because hardly anyone will get the chance to see their brushed stainless steel toilet brush or abstract tulip-shaped toiletpaper holder, these items are unlikely to be only so much ammunition in the status war.

Monday, December 28, 2009

Estimating black-white racial tension from 1850 to present

Previously I looked at how much attention elite whites have given to blacks since the 1870s by measuring the percent of all Harvard Crimson articles that contained the word "negro." That word stopped being used in any context after 1970, which doesn't allow us to see what's happened since then. Also, it is emotionally neutral, so while it tells us how much blacks were on the radar screen of whites, it doesn't suggest what emotions colored their conversations about race.

When tensions flare, people will start using the more charged words more frequently. The obvious counterpart to "negro" in this context is "nigger." It could be used by white racists, non-racists who are quoting or decrying white racists, by blacks trying to "re-claim" the term, by those debating whether or not the term should be used in any context, and so on. Basically, when racial tension is relatively low, these arguments don't come up as often, so the word won't appear as often.

I've searched the NYT back to 1852 and plotted how prevalent "nigger" was in a given year, though smoothing the data out using 5-year moving averages (click to enlarge):


We see high values leading up and throughout the Civil War, a comparatively lower level during Reconstruction, followed by two peaks that mark "the nadir of American race relations." It doesn't change much going through the 1920s, even though this is the period of the Great Migration of blacks from the South to the West and Northeast. It falls and stays pretty low during the worst part of the Great Depression, WWII, and the first 10 years after the war. This was a period of increasing racial consciousness and integration, and the prevalence of "negro" in the Crimson was increasing during this time as well. That means that there was a greater conversation taking place, but that it wasn't nasty in tone.

However, starting in the late 1950s it moves sharply upward, reaching a peak in 1971. This is the period of the Civil Rights movement, which on an objective level was merely continuing the previous trend of greater integration and dialogue. Yet just as we'd guess from what we've studied, the subjective quality of this phase of integration was much more acrimonious. Things start to calm down throughout the '70s and mid-'80s, which our study of history wouldn't lead us to suspect, but which a casual look at popular culture would support. Not only is this a period where pop music by blacks had little of a racial angle -- that was also true of most of the R&B music of most of the '60s -- but was explicitly about putting aside differences and moving on. This is most clearly shown in the disco music scene and its re-birth a few years later during the early '80s dance and pop music scene, when Rick James, Prince, and above all Michael Jackson tried to steer the culture onto a post-racial course.

But then the late '80s usher in a resurgence of identity politics based on race, sex, and sexual orientation ("political correctness," colloquially). The peak year here is technically 1995, but that is only because of the unusual weight given to the O.J. Simpson trial and Mark Fuhrman that year. Ignoring that, the real peak year of the racial tension was 1993 according to this measure. By the late '90s, the level has started to plummet, and the 2000s have been -- or should I say were -- relatively free of racial tension, a point I've made for awhile but that bears repeating since it's not commonly discussed.

Many people mention Obama's election, but that was pretty late in the stage. Think back to Hurricane Katrina and Kanye West trying but failing to foment another round of L.A. riots, or Al Sharpton trying but failing to turn the Jena Six into a civil rights cause celebre, or the mainstream media trying but failing to turn the Duke lacross hoax into a fact that would show how evil white people still are. We shouldn't be distracted by minor exceptions like right-thinking people casting out James Watson because that was an entirely elite and academic affair. It didn't set the entire country on fire. The same is true for the minor exception of Larry Summers being driven out of Harvard, which happened during a remarkably feminism-free time.

Indeed, it's hard to recognize the good times when they're happening -- unless they're fantastically good -- because losses loom larger than gains in our minds. Clearly racial tensions continue to go through cycles, no matter how much objective progress is made in improving the status of blacks relative to whites. Thus, we cannot expect further objective improvements to prevent another wave of racial tension.

Aside from the long mid-20th C hiatus, there are apparently 25 year distances between peaks, which is about one human generation. If the near future is like most of the past, we predict another peak around 2018, a prediction I've made before using similar reasoning about the length of time separating the general social hysterias that we've had -- although in those cases, just going back to perhaps the 1920s or 1900s, not all the way back to the 1850s. Still, right now we're in a fairly calm phase and we should enjoy it while it lasts. If you feel the urge to keep quiet on any sort of racial issues, you should err on the side of being more vocal for right now, since the mob isn't predicted to come out for another 5 years or so, and the peak not until 10 years from now. As a rough guide to which way the racial wind is blowing, simply ask yourself, "Does it feel like it did after Rodney King and the L.A. riots, or after the O.J. verdict?" If not, things aren't that bad.

Looking at absolute levels may be somewhat inaccurate -- maybe all that counts is where the upswings and downswings are. So I've also plotted the year-over-year percent change in how prevalent "nigger" is, though this time using 10-year moving averages to smooth the data out because yearly flucuations up or down are even more volatile than the underlying signal. In this graph, positive values mean the trend was moving upward, negative values mean it was moving downward, and values close to 0 mean it was staying fairly steady:


Again we see sustained positive growth during the Civil War, the two bookends of the nadir of race relations, although we now see a small amount of growth during the Harlem Renaissance era. The Civil Rights period jumps out the most. Here, the growth begins in the mid-1940s, but remember that it was at its lowest absolute levels then, so even the modest increases that began then show up as large percent increases. The PC era of the late '80s through the mid '90s also clearly shows up. There are several periods of relative stasis, but I see three periods of decisively moving against a nasty and bitter tone in our racial conversations: Reconstruction after the Civil War (admittedly not very long or very deep), the late '30s through WWII, and the "these are the good times" / Prince / Michael Jackson era of the mid-late '70s through the mid '80s, which is the most pronounced of all.

That trend also showed up television, when black-oriented sitcoms were incredibly popular. During the 1974-'75 season, 3 of the top 10 TV shows were Good Times, Sanford and Son, and The Jeffersons. The last of those that were national hits, at least as far as I recall, were The Cosby Show, A Different World, Family Matters, The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air, and In Living Color, which were most popular in the late '80s and early '90s. Diff'rent Strokes spans this period perfectly in theme and in time, featuring an integrated cast (and not in the form of a "token black guy") and lasting from 1978 to 1986. The PC movement and its aftermath pretty much killed off the widely appealing black sitcom, although after a quick search, I see that Disney had a top-rated show called That's So Raven in the middle of the tension-free 2000s. But it's hard to think of black-focused shows from the mid-'90s through the early 2000s that were as popular as Good Times or The Cosby Show.

But enough about TV. The point is simply that the academic material we're taught in school usually doesn't take into account what's popular on the radio or TV -- the people's culture only counts if they wrote songs about walking the picket line, showed that women too can be mechanics, or that we shall overcome. Historians, and people generally, are biased to see things as bad and getting worse, so they rarely notice when things were pretty good. But some aspects of popular culture can shed light on what was really going on because its producers are not academics with an axe to grind but entrepreneurs who need to know their audience and stay in touch with the times.

Wednesday, November 11, 2009

Brief: When statesmen weren't elderly

A book that I'm reading casually mentioned that the English politician Bolingbroke became Secretary at War in 1704 -- at age 26. When something seems like it's from another world, it probably reflects the massive changes that the West has seen since making the transition to a society characterized by open entry and competition in both the economic and political spheres. To check this, I've plotted over time how old the entering British Secretary at War was (or whatever new title he may have had, such as Secretary of State for Defence). Here are the results:


Sure enough, up through the first quarter of the 18th C., the Secretary at War's age hovers around 30. By the end of the century, his age has moved to the upper 30s and 40s. During the 19th C. there is more variance, with a handful of Secretaries in their early 30s, but the trend is still upward into the 40s and 50s. After 1900, the youngest has been 38, the oldest 73, with the average at 52. The men with heavy war responsibilities are about 20 years older in post-industrial than in pre-industrial times.

One reason may be that everyone started living longer with industrialization, not just the statesmen. But when you think about it, that cannot explain things. Presumably the 17th C. counterparts of today's lead singers of a rock band were also in their 20s. Elite athletes were likely also in their 20s, as they are today. If there were supermodels back then, you can bet they would have been in their 20s as well. Instead, there has been a shift in what type of people are considered fit for war secretary, which in turn reflects a change in the job description itself.

Violence and Social Orders, the book I'm reading, posits a framework for understanding history through the lens of controlling violence. In a primitive social order, such as those of hunter-gatherers, there is continual violence, no state, and mostly no social organizations beyond kin networks.

The limited access order (or "natural state") controls violence by using the state to create rents for elite members of a dominant coalition. Each elite gets his own piece of turf to extract rents from, and each elite respects the turf of the others because otherwise violence will break out, and that disorder would destroy the rent-creation. To make sure that the rents are sufficient to persuade elite members to refrain from violence, access to the elite is restricted -- if it were open, lots of people would pour in and shrink the amount of the rents going to each person. Still, the shadow of violence always looms over the society, since the means of violence are spread out over the entire elite -- not monopolized by the state -- and they only refrain as long as no one trespasses against them. The threat is always there.

Open access orders are the ones we live in today, where there is political control of the military, the state is used to provide public goods for the masses rather than private rents for the elites, and where the economically powerful earn their money through profits -- doing something productive -- rather than parasitizing rents from the peasants under their control. Violence is rare because the state monopolizes the legitimate use of violence, rather than every elite member being a violence specialist himself or closely allied with one. Elites compete on the basis of the price and quality of the goods and services they provide -- not based on who can defeat whom in a violent battle.

My guess for why open access orders have older statesmen is that since the shadow of violence has been largely removed, you don't need people running military affairs who are itching to pick up arms and go kick some ass. Being a hormone-crazed young person is great in a natural state -- your hair-trigger emotions are suited to a world where you always have to be prepared to fight, and your choleric temper provides a credible threat to would-be trespassers during peacetime. For example, Alexander the Great became King of Macedon at 20 and had conquered much of the known world by his death at 32.

But in open access orders, violence has been stripped from the broad elite and concentrated in the state, and civil war -- that is, intra-elite war -- is rare. So, too, are elite uprisings against the state -- before, these resulted from elites losing their rents and going after the people who were supposed to be providing them. So in these societies hot-headed young people are only going to threaten the peace. The elites are no longer constantly prepared to battle each other, so we only require a calm person to make sure everyone continues to get along. A 26 year-old in charge of the army, by contrast, would grow bored with peace so quickly that he'd want to stir things up "so we at least have something to do."

It's funny that we worry today about how to control young males' violent impulses, which threaten the peace. Only 300 years ago, we would have been grateful to have a young violent male in our social circle -- he would've been extracting rents from us, but at least we'd have someone to protect us from all those other specialists in violence. We truly live in a different world.

Sunday, October 25, 2009

Diversity in aesthetic tastes over the last 130 years: Evidence from names

Updated

Virginia Postrel argues in The Substance of Style that we have entered a new aesthetic age, where design objects are available to a mass audience, where those consumers no longer consider just the price but also the look and feel of the stuff they buy, and so where producers don't compete with each other only on price but also on how aesthetically pleasing their products are. (Think of how many stylish toilet brushes you can buy at Wal-Mart or Target.)

She wrote this in 2003 and claims it began sometime in the mid-to-late 1990s. That trend seemed to take off even more during the recent financial euphoria, and although it's surely taking a beating during the recession, it'll be back once we feel safe spending again.

One thing I kept asking myself was, "Is this really so new?" As a general rule, you should be skeptical of all stories about how we're "entering a new age." After all, what about the 1920s and '30s, which Postrel admits could have been a previous age of aesthetics? She counters that design wasn't enjoyed by nearly as large a fraction of the population as it is today, and that the range of products that were designed with aesthetics in mind also was more limited than today. What about the more mass-market design of the 1950s and '60s? She says that the choices available weren't nearly as varied and driven by customization as the ones we have today.

I've decided to take a different approach by looking at baby names, a program pioneered by Stanley Lieberson to investigate fashions (summarized in his excellent book A Matter of Taste). Unlike toilet brushes, cars, or paintings, names you give your baby don't cost money. They carry non-monetary costs -- you wouldn't name your kid Adolf, and it's not because you'd have to plunk down big bucks to register that name. Still, they are a lot closer to the ideal test of someone's desires where you ask them to "pretend that price isn't an issue."

Postrel sees the choice to endow an object with aesthetic qualities as "making it special." That has two consequences: it will tend to create turnover, as people start to make things special by making them different from what they were like yesterday; and it will tend to make things more diverse, as individuals try to look different from each other today. Lieberson has already provided graphs from many European countries on the turnover in names over time, going back centuries. The take-home message is that roughly before the industrial era, there was little to no turnover in names. (He measures turnover as the number of names in this year's Top 10 that were not present in last year's Top 10.) With industrialization, the fashion in names took off. The turnover rate really shoots up sometime in the mid-20th C., but it's not clear if it's something different or just the rapid-growth phase of a single, sustained exponential increase.

That's not too surprising, and it underscores the importance of not believing in "new era" stories. To a first approximation, there was the transition to agriculture, and then the transition to industrial capitalism -- and that's it. That's basically all we see in Lieberson's turnover data -- there is a pre-industrial stage with no turnover and an industrial stage with high turnover, and that's about all.

What about the diversity of names? Even if there were no turnover in the Top 10 names, we could still see people introducing more and more new names in order to make their children special. Recall that a big part of Postrel's story is that in our new aesthetic age, we really value standing out from others at the same point in time, not simply moving from one universal style to another over time. Lieberson does have some graphs on how highly concentrated names are, but the data are much more regional than national, they only cover some of the 20th C (although a decent chunk of it), and the measure isn't as precise as it could be. (He uses the percent of all names that are held by the Top 20 names, as well as the percent of all names that are given to only one person.) The rough pattern is that diversity of names seems somewhat static from roughly 1920 through either 1945 or 1960, and by no later than 1960 we see a tendency toward greater diversity.

To solve these problems somewhat, I turn to the Social Security Administration's archive of popular baby names. These are national data, so the sample size is a lot larger than Lieberson's regional data, and the regional differences are smoothed out. They also cover more time -- 1880 to 2008. And I've used a more standard measure of variation when the data are not quantitative (like names), as well as develop a measure of my own that is more flexible.

The standard measure I use is one of many ways to measure "qualitative variation," where the data are not numbers. It is thus impossible to compute how far a given datum deviates from the mean, and thus impossible to compute the variance. For data that are numbers -- height, IQ, etc. -- the variance tells us how spread out vs. how similar the values are. In the Appendix, I discuss what the two measures I use are, the standard one and my own. The only thing you need to know is that bigger values mean greater diversity.

With that out of the way, let's see what the historical pattern of conformity vs. diversity has been in aesthetic tastes. There are separate data for males and females, so I also show what the female - male gap has been:




First, note that the female line is always above the male line, a pattern that shows up in Lieberson's turnover data too. Parents give greater fashionableness to their daughters' names, and are less enthusiastic about their sons standing out.

There certainly has been a sharp increase during the past generation, starting around 1983 for boys and 1987 for girls. But that's nothing new. There was a more modest upturn from just after WWII until the early-mid 1980s. Moreover, there was another pronounced increase going back at least to 1880 (and probably before -- remember that the turnover data tracked industrialization), which fizzled out around 1905 for girls and 1910 for boys. From then until the post-WWII era, diversity actually stagnated or slightly declined. This trend obviously goes against what we'd expect from our view of the 1920s and '30s as a previous age of aesthetics. At least in the sense of "making special" as distinguishing things from one another in the same time period, the turn-of-the-century through the post-WWII era was conformist compared to the dizzying changes of the earlier industrializing stage or the turbulence that would follow.

In looking at the female - male gap, we are looking at another facet of culture -- namely, how egalitarian-minded people were with respect to sex (and perhaps in general). We see a narrowing of the gap from at least as far back as 1880 until 1915. From then until 1969, we see a general widening of the gap, although there are noticeable egalitarian dips during the depth of the Great Depression in the early-mid 1930s and during WWII. From 1915 until WWII, the widening gap is caused by boys receiving more similar names, with little change among girls. To me, that suggests traditionalism -- don't make girls' names any more fashionable, and drive boys names away from being fashion symbols.

From WWII to 1969, though -- i.e., during the Baby Boom -- the widening gap is caused by girls receiving more diverse names at a faster rate than boys are. This is a compromise between tradition and change -- clearly it's a break with the traditional values by making boys names more subject to fashion, but you don't notice it so much because girls' names are becoming even more subject to fashion.

Once the earliest Baby Boomers (born around 1945) reach child-bearing age (around 25), or in 1970, we see a steady reversal. Boomers wanted to equalize the outcomes of their own babies, and this was mostly due to slowing down the fashionableness of girls' names. That's what they tried elsewhere -- recognizing that females are more compliant than males, you should force females to be more like males rather than vice versa. Boomers were more likely to favor "bring your daughter to work day" than "give your son a dollhouse to play with."

There is a brief widening of the gap from 1987 to 1996, and this corresponds to the generation I've elsewhere called the disco-punk generation. They are too young to be canonical Boomers and too old to be Generation X-ers. I've estimated that they were born between about 1958 and 1964, so the typical member born in the early '60s would have started having kids in the late 1980s. This generation is very different from Boomers and X-ers, not having been ideological or attention-whoring when they were coming of age around 1980.

However, once the prototypical Gen X-er, born in 1971, starts having kids in 1997, the gap starts to close again. Remember, they were the ones who made Third Wave feminism a success.

So, the female - male gap shows us that our aesthetic preferences reflect larger social and cultural changes, such as how ideological we are about sex equality.

Even the overall data, which don't show such sensitivity to smaller-scale social changes, still reflect social change, although at a much larger level. The industrializing and globalizing stage was completed around the turn of the century. The change in the connectedness of the global economy was far greater from 1830 to 1920 than from 1920 to today. And most of the major innovations that came with industrialization were in place by then too. Those allowed design objects to reach a wider market, as well as greater customization with each passing year. We see this saturation of the industrial trends by the flat lines from roughly 1910 to 1945.

After WWII, we did start another round of changes away from manufacturing and toward services, and toward consumption of more "frivolous" goods and services than more basic ones, as the former became cheaper. What Postrel calls the new age of aesthetics really began in the mid-1980s, perhaps reflecting our greater taste for fashion items as we began to borrow more to buy more.

To conclude, we've found hard data showing that Postrel's hunch was right about the last generation being more and more aesthetically minded. But contrary to her "first time ever" theme, there was fantastic change during the industrializing stage too. Unfortunately the data don't go back to the beginning of that stage, which would probably show the trend even more clearly. But like I said before, that's the expected picture -- there's the shift to agriculture and the shift to industrial capitalism, and the rest are just hiccups.

Update: The historical pattern of rising diversity from the late 19th C through WWI, a stagnation or slight decline from then until WWII, and then another stage of sharp increase, mirrors the pattern of American openness to international trade. We became more integrated from the late 19th C through WWI, became more isolationist and protectionist from then until WWII, and then began reducing barriers to global trade. Perhaps there is some abstract "openness to differences" that characterizes the zeitgeist -- wanting to trade with people all over the world vs. economic nationalism, as well as wanting to explore a wider range of baby names vs. having more parochial tastes.

Appendix

Here are the graphs using the standard statistic. The patterns are harder to see because the lines have to obey a ceiling of 1, whereas the statistic I used lets them go wherever they want as long as they're not negative. The female - male gap doesn't reveal the influence of the disco-punk generation, but the other patterns are there.




The standard statistic is:

(N / (N - 1)) * (1 - sum((share)^2))

Here, N is the number of names. The Social Security Administration gives the top 1000 names, so it's 1000. A name's "share" is what fraction of the sample has that name. We square each name's share, add them up, subtract from one, and multiply by N / (N - 1). This gives us the probability that two randomly chosen individuals will have different names. If it's 0, everyone has the same name, while if it's 1, everyone has a unique name. I include the graphs based on this statistic as an appendix since they show roughly the same patterns but not as clearly, given how constrained the possible values are.

I don't like this statistic because it's forced to lie between 0 and 1, whereas the variance of a distribution just has to be non-negative. We want to let the measure grow infinitely large in order to capture cases where the data are that spread out. I made up my own statistic, but there are probably others like it out there already; not having a PhD in statistics, I don't know what they're called. The idea is similar to the first one. Start with the shares, and see what would happen at the two extremes of "everyone is the same" vs. "everyone is unique."

Like the inventors of the first statistic, I hit on the idea of squaring the shares and summing them up. (It's the obvious way to go if you start down this path.) With an infinitely large number of names, the extremes are 0 for all-unique and 1 for all-same. By taking the log of this, we get new extremes of negative infinity for all-unique and 0 for all-same. Multiply by -1, and they all become non-negative values that increase as the diversity increases, just like a variance is supposed to be:

- ln( sum ( (share)^2))

The sum of the squared shares is the probability that a randomly chosen pair share a name, and we'll just label that p. Then my statistic, which I call the name diversity index, is:

ln( 1 / p)

Again, the key is that it's 0 when everyone is the same and tends toward infinity when everyone is unique, just like variance.

Monday, October 19, 2009

The robber barons slashed prices, boosted output, and saw eroding profit margins

One of the lessons we take away from our high school and college history classes is that during the latter half of the 19th C. America was ruled by robber barons -- powerful businessmen who wielded nearly monopolistic power over the hapless little guy, riding roughshod over the entire society for want of regulatory restraints. That all changed when populist and progressive politicians and muckraking journalists exposed the abuses of Gilded Age and turn-of-the-century industrialists.

Like most folktales, though, it bears little resemblance to the truth. Its function is instead to provide a creation mythology for contemporary regulators to justify present-day attacks on so-called robber barons. I've gone through data on railroads from a turn-of-the-century edition of the Statistical Abstract of the United States, and right in the middle of all of that populist and progressive agitation, it was totally clear that they were pushing an image of the world that was completely backwards. If powerful monopolists are harming consumers, we should see output shrinking and prices soaring. If they were gouging consumers, they should have seen ever greater profits over time -- again, until they were restrained by the government. This approach also allows us to test whether the antitrust legislation had any beneficial effect -- we can just look at what was going on before and after it was passed.

I've chosen railroads because the Wikipedia article on robber barons shows that most of the outrage was directed at railroad magnates -- they are more represented in lists than are captains of other industries. Let's first take a look at output. Imagine De Beers, which used to control almost all of the world's diamond supply, responding to lower revenues -- they'd simply choke off the flow of diamonds into the market, so that diamond buyers would compete more intensely over an artificial shortage of diamonds. Here are graphs showing the total number of miles of railroad in operation, the number of miles added each year, the number of passengers carried, and the amount of freight carried:


The antitrust era began more or less in 1890 with the Sherman Act. Before this time, output did not contract. There is stagnant output from about 1830 to 1850 while the industry is in its infancy. After 1850, though, there may be cycles up and down, but the clear trend is toward steadily greater output over time. If anything, the decade after the Sherman Act was passed saw shrinking or stagnant output. The number of passengers served and the weight of freight carried also rose steadily at least from the early 1880s for the next decade (earlier data are not available). The picture after 1890 isn't clear, but we can rule out a beneficial effect of the Sherman Act, which would have sent the numbers steadily upward and at a faster rate than before. Remember, the trend was already increasing before 1890.

This behavior is the opposite of a monopolist who would want to only serve fewer and fewer people. Imagine if the Super Bowl organizers sold 1000 fewer tickets year after year -- prices would skyrocket. So, these three separate measures of output show that railroad owners behaved in the opposite way of monopolists -- they kept giving consumers more of what they wanted.

We might predict from this that prices that consumers paid would have fallen as a result of expanding output -- when there's a glut of stuff, people prefer to pay less for it. The evil robber baron picture predicts that prices should have shot up. Let's see who is right by looking at freight rates on wheat per bushel (in dollars), while comparing rates across three types of transportation:


Water-only transport became nominally more expensive from the early 1850s through the late 1860s, although this is not adjusted for inflation. The key is that it began falling sharply from the late 1860s through the late 1870s, fell a bit more shallowly for another decade, and declined very modestly after 1890. Here is a completely different method of transportation -- by water rather than over land -- and we see falling prices. So at least owners of water transport were not monopolists. Was the story any different for the rates that railroad owners charged? Not at all: we see the same pattern of rapid decline from the late 1860s through the late 1870s, modest decline for another decade, and very slow decline after 1890. Again, we see no effect of the Sherman Act -- if anything, the antitrust era saw slower price decreases.

So, railroad magnates were the opposite of monopolists, boosting output and charging lower prices over time. Still, we might salvage the picture of bloated industrialists by looking at their profits -- you could charge lower prices and make up for it on volume. Alas, when we look at how much money they brought in for carrying either passengers or freight for a mile (in cents), we see that railroad owners pocketed less and less dough:


Whether it was from freight or passengers, railroads received less and less money from at least the early 1880s onward, again with no sign of the Sherman Act in the data. The leading railroads have data going back farther, and they show falling revenues going back at least to the 1870s. Here too we see that the antitrust era that began in the 1890s was associated with a slower rate of declining revenues. In fact, the robber barons took their biggest clobbering of the Gilded Age during the 1870s, decades before there was any substantial elite outcry to rein them in.

That is exactly what we expect from a new and highly profitable industry -- once businessmen hear about how profitable it is, more and more will enter it, and the resulting bitter competition will drive down profits until the industry is no more profitable than a typical industry. If you were one of the lucky initial railroad owners back in the 1830s, you may have made a pretty penny for the moment when you had little or no competition. But at least by 1870 -- and probably somewhat earlier -- that brief period of uncolonized paradise was long gone. The magnates saw leaner and leaner profit margins, while consumers saw more and more miles of railroads that could carry them and their stuff for lower and lower prices.

Not to put too fine a point on it, but a lot of what we learned in school about businessmen was utter nonsense. If we taught facts, we would teach kids that the robber barons kept giving their consumers more of what they wanted and at lower prices -- and these data don't even factor in the consumer benefits of enjoying improvements in quality that railroads implemented as they grew from newcomer to mature industries. A railroad trip in 1885 was more pleasant than a railroad trip in 1845. And all the while, they made less and less money on these ventures, rather than fatten themselves up by abusing their power, which they clearly had very little of.

The facts are not hard to understand, so that's not the reason that they aren't taught. Indeed, the teachers themselves don't know these facts because they're not taught in intro college history classes either. The idea that captains of industry were ruining the lives of ordinary people can be very easily tested with data available to anyone with an internet connection, and the results show that our received picture of the world is not just a little bit off but completely wrong. As I said earlier, this mythology about the dark demons known as robber barons and the angelic saviors called populists and progressives is really just another creation myth. Like other such myths, it merely rationalizes the will of the group that is currently in power -- namely, the government and particularly the regulators.

"Why do those people have jobs, teacher?"

"Well, you see Jayden, if we didn't have them, darkness would descend over the land. Let me tell you the story of how the world used to be before the antitrust regulators arrived to deliver us from the wickedness of the robber barons..."

This fake picture we have extends to other industries as well -- I got the idea for this post by learning about the history of Standard Oil, which also was responsible for higher output, lower prices and profits, and saw its market share erode over time. In the popular-audience stuff, I haven't seen much discussion of railroads, although there may be academic articles on the topic. The most important thing here is the graphs, which you rarely see even in journal articles. You're lucky to see full tables. Here, the pattern jumps out at you, showing just how ridiculous the stories we've been told are.

Monday, September 7, 2009

Has the free market been taken too seriously or not seriously enough?

In a recent essay in the New York Times Magazine about why so many economists failed to predict the current crisis, Paul Krugman argues that a big piece is the cheerleading of Panglossian free marketeers, which helped to hide from view the possibility that markets can screw up, perhaps in very disastrous ways. Sure, there were a handful of skeptics and nay-sayers, but according to Krugman, they were too small in number or decibel level to get the attention of mainstream economists.

Not knowing much about the history of economic thought, I decided to see for myself by searching the "economics" section of JSTOR for articles that discuss markets failing. If Krugman's right, these should either be low in absolute number (whether they're up or down, they aren't enough to get people's attention), or if they're high in number, they should have been declining (as the cheerleading swept across the profession).

I've previously shown that the idea of money illusion declined in popularity from the mid-1970s onward, which is more of the kind of imperfections that Krugman is talking about. I could look for other ideas related to behavioral economics or behavioral finance, but these focus on how psychology affects economic behavior. I'm not sure they're the best measure of how common are ideas about the market failing. So, I looked instead at market failure ideas related to information -- these don't imply a wrinkle here or there due to some quirk of psychology, but to larger market failures. The most well known example is George Akerlof's hypothetical example of "the market for lemons" (used cars).

The phrases I searched for are "asymmetric information," "adverse selection," and "network externalities." I threw in "irrational exuberance" out of curiosity. If those terms are unfamiliar, I can't explain them at length, except to note that they are hypotheses about how markets can fail. (For instance, if the buyer knows something the seller doesn't, or vice versa; or if people value a technology not only for its use to them as individuals but also in relation to how big the network of users is.) They have Wikipedia entries, though.

I standardized the counts first by dividing by the total number of articles, which gives the % of all articles containing the keyword. This just tells us how prevalent the idea is, but it may be more useful to standardize by comparing the counts of the market failure ideas to the counts of articles that mention some completely basic idea in economics. That way, we can see how much respect the new ideas are given relative to time-tested ones. (It is like a person in 1997 comparing the stock prices of the dot-com companies to stocks in more mature industries.) I chose "supply and demand" as the fundamental concept to compare them to -- that's about as basic and popular of an economic concept as you can think of.

The pattern looks the same no matter what I use as the standardizing term, so I've stuck with the % of all articles measurement for all terms, although I've also included a graph with the comparison to "supply and demand" for two keywords to show just how much attention they have been given. Here are the results:



Clearly these ideas have only been gaining in popularity among economists. Indeed, the pioneers in this line of hypothesis-generating have received the Nobel Prize in economics for this work -- an event that should make us skeptical of Krugman's claim about how clueless economists have been, re: the possibility of markets screwing up. The broadest terms are currently pushing around 10% of all articles -- not too shabby. Moreover, since the late 1990s, the idea of "asymmetric information" has been on par with or even above the idea of "supply and demand" in how commonly discussed they are. It's hard to imagine beating "supply and demand" in a popularity contest, but there you have it.

(Indeed, perhaps it is the infatuation with such ideas that blinded many economists to basic concepts like supply and demand -- for instance, that housing prices were shooting up because demand was shooting up, as it does during a bubble, not because of some radical shift in the interest rate, construction costs, or population size, as Robert Shiller showed years before the bubble burst.)

Krugman did not claim that if only economists had paid more attention to market failure theories involving asymmetric information, they would've seen the crisis coming. But his broader claim about how sanguine the profession had become about the superiority of markets and the small chance that they'd screw up big -- this claim is wrong. Asymmetric information economists and behavioral economists have recently won the Nobel Prize, and we've just seen that the former ideas have only gained in popularity, rivaling even the respect given to the concept of "supply and demand"!

I think the poor showing of economists is not due to theoretical blinders so much as it is to their desire to fit in with polite society (which in turn may influence what theoretical hunches they have). No one wants to rain on the parade during a boom or period of apparent great moderation. Others will take offense, turn them out, and so on. The two economists who had the most foresight, Robert Shiller and Nouriel Roubini, don't care how well accepted they are. Shiller's mind is that of an engineering nerd, which doesn't register a social faux pas very sensitively. And Roubini is someone who gets a thrill out of telling other people how stupid or clueless they are (this is the main appeal for academics in many fields). So obviously he won't care if he's an outcast.

Many view economists as asocial or autistic nerds, but that doesn't seem to be so true -- they have fully functional and thirsty social antennae, but they were the ones left out of the cool kids crowd in high school, and who desperately want to be part of respectable society as adults. Hence all their name-dropping about Mozart, Picasso, exotic cuisine, and which neighborhoods in Zagreb are the most authentic. "See, we're not just a bunch of math geeks! Let us join the party!"

Clearly seeing the current crisis would have required them to call polite society a bunch of idiots -- for believing that home prices can only go up, up, up -- or recklessly ideological for using PC to debauch lending standards. Not the best way to get invited to the right dinner parties, the board of directors at the right institutions, or the conferences of right-thinking society.

Sunday, September 6, 2009

Brief: When did elite whites start obsessing over blacks?

It's routine nowadays to hear well-to-do white people casually slipping into conversation that their best friend is black, or worrying out loud about how we can improve the lot of blacks in a discriminating society. Clearly that wasn't so at some point -- blacks were out of sight, out of mind. So when did the shift take place? The story we're told in school is that it took the Civil Rights movement to wake white people up. Let's look at the Harvard Crimson archives to see.

Here we have a group of New England white elite college students -- just the group who first paid attention to black causes. I simply searched the Crimson for "negro" and plotted this number as a percent of articles with the neutral word "one," using 5-year moving averages to smooth out the data. Here is the result:


The sharp drop at the end is obviously just an artifact of the word "negro" becoming taboo after the Civil Rights movement. The peak year is 1963, when Martin Luther King, Jr. delivered his "I have a dream" speech during the March on Washington. Also not very surprising. But it's not as if whites were unaware of black issues before then, and were suddenly awakened or caught off-guard by the events of the mid-1950s and after. Far from it: the sustained upward trend begins immediately after the Great Migration of blacks from the southeast into the northeastern US and California. There is another jump around 1940, with greater growth afterward, probably reflecting the Second Great Migration of blacks out of the southeast.

There's also a small rise-and-fall in interest that peaks around 1900, but this could be due to the smaller sample size during these early years. A graph (not shown) of the raw count of "negro" articles shows no hump there, although the swing upward after 1920 or so is apparent.

When you see the graph, it may not seem very surprising -- as blacks came into more frequent contact with Northern whites, it seems natural that Harvard undergrads would start paying more attention to them. This cannot be due to the perceived economic threat that the newly arrived blacks posed, as with the string of race riots that erupted when working class whites saw blacks as labor market competition. Poor blacks from the south were not going to get into Harvard. So, this attention must reflect some combination of paternalism -- "how can we take care of these new people?" -- and cultural, if not economic, anxiety -- "what does this migration mean for our way of life?"

But the graph is very surprising if you only relied on what you were taught in school -- i.e., that whites were lulled into complacency for a long time, thinking that their poor treatment of blacks wouldn't come back to bite them, only to be shocked out of their slumber by Rosa Parks and Malcolm X. That story is wrong, as the data show. The steady increase began decades before the Civil Rights movement, which was more of a culmination than a beginning. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X were jumping on a bandwagon that had been picking up speed for decades. It was the Jazz Age, not the Civil Rights era, that woke whites up to black culture.

This serves as a reminder that sea changes in society are rarely due to the actions of single, charismatic individuals, but rather reflect interactions among people at the grassroots level, as Tolstoy believed. The individuals who get holidays named after them are just celebrities that we single out, not the ones who got the bandwagon going in the first place. We can't know their names because it rarely starts off as a concerted movement with planners or leaders.

Saturday, August 29, 2009

Brief: Have we gotten more or less sympathetic since Adam Smith's time?

In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith made the observation that we care less about the disasters that befall others if they are remote and faceless, while we panic at much smaller hardships of our own. But he wrote that before the Industrial Revolution really took off, and so before the peace-and-life-valuing merchant classes genetically replaced the old warring aristocratic class. In the meantime, capital punishment has been widely banned across Europe and its off-shoots, we have laws against cruelty to animals, and we have TV and other media that provide us with vivid daily images of the troubles that beset people in far-off places. So, does his observation still hold up in our more bleeding heart times?

To check this, I searched the NYT for its coverage of a rival first-world country, Japan, and a non-threatening third-world country, Indonesia. If newspapers cover a country out of sympathy for their plight -- and this supply would reflect demand for such coverage -- then there should be declining coverage of Japan during their incredible boom of the 1980s, but increasingly more coverage as they slid into the Lost Decade of the 1990s and even early half of the 2000s. Similarly, coverage of Indonesia should spike during 2004 - 2005 in the wake of the disastrous tsunami, which hit Indonesia much harder than other countries. (This event was pretty close to Smith's hypothetical earthquake that swallowed all of China.) There should also be a spike during their financial crisis of 1997 - 1998, although this was not a deadly catastrophe that could provide the level of gory detail as a tsunami, so this spike should be smaller than that of the tsunami coverage.

Here is the NYT's coverage of these countries:




Counter to the sympathy hypothesis, coverage of Japan shot up during the 1980s, as Americans began to fear more and more that Japan was going to economically take over our country. When Japan slid into a long recession, those fears evaporated, and the supply of alarming stories declined as a result, all the way to the present. This is not to say that there was no demand for sympathy stories about the Japanese recession, only that fear is a stronger driver of coverage than sympathy.

The Indonesia data give some support to the sympathy hypothesis. There is indeed a two-year increase for 2004 - 2005, reversing a previous steady decline. After that moment of sympathy, though, coverage starts to decline again. Moreover, the upward blip during the tsunami is tiny compared to the skyrocketing coverage of 1997 - 1998, when Indonesia was rocked by a financial crisis. This reflects our panic that the Asian Financial Crisis would infect our own economy. Before this threat to us, we paid relatively little -- and consistently little -- attention to Indonesia.

On the whole, the coverage data support Adam Smith's claim, despite our being more emotionally sensitive than people were during his time. However, there is no real paradox here if we view the demand for sympathy stories -- and the coverage that supplies that demand -- as a function of both some baseline concern for others plus a component that responds to actual disasters. Let's say that sympathy is a simple, linear function of disasters:

S = b + r*D

Where S is level of sympathy, b is our baseline level in the absence of news about disasters, D is the level of disasters that we hear about, and r measures how responsive our sympathy is to those disasters.

All that Smith was saying is that r is greater for disasters that are nearer to us than for disasters that are more remote. He made no claim about our baseline level. The genetic and cultural proliferation of the merchant classes -- and the concomitant doing away with public executions, slavery, etc. -- may have increased the baseline without affecting how r responds to disasters at different social distances. This seems like a useful distinction to draw, as it clears up a lot of the confusion about whether we've become more selfish or sensitive in recent centuries.

Sunday, August 23, 2009

The changing social climate of young people from 1870 to present

[This will end up being quite long, so I will post it in three stages for easier digestion. Expect two updates during the week. First update on generations added.]

OK, so the title is a bit ambitious, but I've finally found a way to measure this. Anyone who's read my personal blog knows that one of my obsessions is documenting what's going on among young people. They typically leave very little in terms of a written record, and as adults most people erase the memories of their adolescence -- to the benefit of their mental health -- and replace them with whatever accords with their grown-up worldview. For example, they may imagine adolescents as relatively innocent creatures, whereas their memories -- if unearthed -- would remind them of what an anarchic jungle secondary school was, in contrast to the much more tranquil social lives of adults.

So, the need for a clearer picture of young people's lives is great, yet clearly unmet. As luck would have it, The Harvard Crimson (the undergraduate newspaper) has placed all of its content online, stretching back to the paper's origin in 1873, and it is fully searchable. This allows me to search for some signal of the zeitgeist year by year and plot the strength of this signal over time. If you read my three-part series at GNXP on the changing intellectual climate, as judged by what appears in academic journals, the approach is the same. (Here are those articles: Death of Marxism, etc., A follow-up, and Popularity of science in studying humans.)

In short, I count the number of articles in a given year that have some keyword -- "Marxism," for example -- and then standardize this by dividing by a very common neutral word. This protects against seeing an imaginary trend that is simply due to the newspaper pumping out many more articles over time (or fewer in hard times). Ideally, I would standardize by using "the" since it appears in every article and therefore gives us the total number of articles, answering the question "What percent of all articles in that year contained this keyword?" Unfortunately, the Crimson search engine won't allow me to use "the," but it did let me search for "one," which is also a highly frequent word and will be a decent substitute. Before getting into the meat of the post, here is the number of articles found by searching for "one" across time:


We were correct to standardize somehow, given the huge increase since the early 1990s (probably reflecting the greater ease of desktop publishing with cheap computers and software).

A real improvement over the previous series that used JSTOR is that the Crimson archives run right up to the present, whereas JSTOR typically has a 5-year lag between the article's being published and being archived in JSTOR. The only limitation here is that we only see what's going on among upper-middle class young people, rather than all of them, but I'm mostly looking at events or topics that permeate our society, rather than academic fads as before. (Although I will probably look into that as well using the Crimson database.) So these youngsters ought to be fairly representative.

Moving on to the substance, I've put together graphs on three broad topics that are of great importance to young people. Adults also tend to worry about where the next generation stands on these topics. They are identity politics, religion, and generational awareness.

Identity politics

Everyone knows that the 1960s brought a sea change in college student culture, but I don't think anyone has presented a clear picture of how the concern with racism, sexism, etc. began or how it has changed over time to the present. In particular, most people (in my experience) over-estimate how prevalent identity politics were in the '60s, while forgetting how widespread the corresponding hysteria was in the early 1990s.

I began at the earliest date that the word appears or 1960, whichever came first, and end in 2008. The y-axis shows the count of articles with the keyword divided by the count of articles with "one." I chose the following identity politics keywords: "racism" or "racist," "sexism" or "sexist," "homophobia" or "homophobic," "date rape," and "hate speech." I also made a composite which sums all of them up. Here are the results:


"Racism" increases sharply through the '60s, peaks in 1970, and declines moderately through the '70s and '80s. However, starting in the late '80s, there's another surge which peaks in 1992. After the early '90s panic, though, the preoccupation with racism has declined substantially, so much so that it is now back down to its pre-late-'60s level. You'll recall how little widespread disruption there was in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the Jena Six, and the Duke lacrosse hoax, despite every professional activist -- and even Kanye West on a televised awards show -- struggling to whip up society into another revolution. But 2006 had none of the racial hysteria to fuel it that 1992 did, so it was impossible to spark another round of race riots in L.A.

As for "sexism," it only begins in 1970. Many people who weren't alive back then don't remember how little of a role women's liberation played in The Sixties. But I used to be a radical activist in my naive college days, and Z Magazine operator Michael Albert emphasized that second-wave feminism was largely a delayed response to the perceived sexism of the anti-war, civil rights, and anti-capitalist movements that formed the basis of the counter-culture's concerns. Although there is not much change during the '70s and '80s, it got a pretty high jump initially, so it's not as though there were few adherents -- there just wasn't a massive increase. But once again, starting in 1988 there's a resurgence that peaks in 1992. This is when third-wave feminism was born, and it coincided with the resurgence of racial politics.

However, just as with race, panic about sex plummeted shortly afterward and is currently even lower than its initial level. Again, recall how few massive protests there were -- if any -- about the Duke lacrosse hoax, whose bogus premise was a bunch of jocks raping a stripper. Or for that matter, how pathetic the response was to the Larry Summers brou-ha-ha of early 2005. It surely generated some controversy among academics, but even that didn't last very long, and no one outside of academia gave a shit. In particular, the students didn't care -- influence from their leftist professors notwithstanding. If the zeitgeist lacks an obsession with sex roles, their feminist professors can preach all they want, but it will only fall on deaf ears.

Paying attention to homophobia only begins in 1977 -- 8 full years after the Stonewall Riots. And remember, that was in 1969, a ripe time for liberationist and revolutionary movements. This underscores the importance of using quantitative data in reconstructing history, since most people nowadays would imagine that back in the turbulent '60s, they were surely fighting against homophobia the way that their counterparts do now. Far from it. Back in the '60s, and even for most of the '70s and early '80s, campus radicals and liberals couldn't have cared less. Again, back then it was all about civil rights, stopping the imperialist war machine, and maybe smashing capitalism -- not about gay marriage or getting more women into science careers.

As we saw with "racism" and "sexism," "homophobia" saw a sharp rise in the late '80s and peaked in 1989 or '90, before dropping precipitously afterward. Currently it is more or less where it was before the late '80s surge. Liberals and young people may support gay marriage, but the larger meta-narrative of homophobia, as the activists would say, does not interest them.

Now we come to two more specific topics. "Date rape" basically tracks third-wave feminism, although there is an isolated occurrence in 1979 (which I exclude from the graph to keep the trend clear). Quite simply, there is rape and there is not-rape. "Date rape" was a term that tried to criminalize sex that wasn't rape, but where the girl regretted it or was unsure of what was happening. Probably the guy was stinking drunk too. Importantly, claims about "date rape" drugs later turned out to be bogus, as doctors in the UK pointed out -- most of the women claiming to have been slipped a "date rape drug" had no such drug in their system, although they typically did have lots of alcohol or other hard drugs present. It was essentially a witch-hunt or moral panic. By now, we know what to expect -- a sharp rise during the late '80s that peaks in 1992 and falls off a cliff shorter thereafter. Nowadays no one takes the idea seriously.

"Hate speech" shows roughly the same pattern, although it doesn't get started quite as early. It appears suddenly in 1990, peaks in 1991, and plummets right away. Aside from an anomalous jump in 2002 - '03 (which may reflect some event specific to Harvard), it has remained very low for nearly 15 years. Compared to college students during the heyday of Generation X back in 1991 - '92, young people today are more likely to view the concept of "hate speech" as a thinly veiled attempt to censor unpopular viewpoints.

It's interesting to note the differences in scale among the five topics. The "racism" scale is 3 times as great as those for "sexism," "homophobia," and "date rape," confirming what many others have observed -- that in the struggle for a bigger piece of the identity politics pie, race has trumped sex or sexuality. The scale for "hate speech" is about 3 times smaller than the previously mentioned three topics, perhaps because it is so specific, while "racism" pops up in many more contexts.

The composite identity politics index shows roughly the same pattern that we've noted before. There's a jump during the '60s which peaks in 1970 -- this only reflects a concern with racism. There is little or slightly negative growth during the '70s and '80s, but this was only the calm before the storm. In the late '80s, another wave of panics sweep through, and there is a sustained peak from 1989 through 1992. I have often pointed out in my personal blog and less often at GNXP that the peak of the social hysteria is 1991 - 1992, and this confirms that claim.

As with other epidemics, eventually it burns out, and obsessing over identity politics is now at or below its pre-late-'60s level. This overall pattern does not change even if I remove the two topics of "date rape" and "hate speech" that might seem to bias things toward producing an early '90s peak. Hard as it may be to believe for anyone younger than the Baby Boomers, identity politics was simply a very small piece of the radical chic calling back in the '60s -- it was about civil rights, anti-war, and capital.

Generational awareness

We often speak of young people as an entire generation, but that only works when they have strong generational awareness or solidarity. Otherwise, they are merely a cohort. To give a personal example, I am too young to be part of Generation X, yet I'm a bit older than the Millennials. Almost no one my age (roughly mid-late 20s) is stuck in the culture of their adolescence and college years and never will be, in the way that many Baby Boomers are culturally stuck in 1968 and many Gen X-ers are stuck in 1992. It is possible to be a traitor to your generation if you're a Boomer or X-er, but since my cohort doesn't view itself as a Generation, the idea of defecting fails to make sense.

The same goes for the cohort born between roughly 1958 and 1964 -- their age-mates will not burn them at the stake for saying that they never liked disco music or punk rock, unlike a Boomer who said he didn't like the Beatles' later albums or a Gen X-er who said he always thought alternative rock was lame.

In any case, how do we quantify this sentiment? I simply searched the Crimson for "generation," which will turn up any time a member of a Generation writes about their age-mates as though they were a cohesive group, as well as when older people recognize the young people of today as being different and a cohesive group. I assume that its secondary use as a synonym for creation is roughly constant over time, so that changes reflect its primary use. The counts for the very early years are low, and the number of articles with "one" is also low, so I'm not so sure that the standardized measurement is telling us something real for that time period. Thus, along with the standardized graph, I've included one that shows just the counts. Here are the results:


The trendline is exponential, although other simple trends show roughly the same picture. It seems that during Gilded Age and Progressive Era, thinking in generational terms was not very common, although it does turn up toward the end of the Progressive Era. I'll get to my conjecture about this after surveying the other periods.

During the Roaring Twenties and through the Great Depression and WWII, the level is much greater than the historical trend and lasts very long. This may strike us as unexpected because we associate inter-generational conflict mostly with the late 1960s -- but if you thought young people were going crazy then, you should have seen them during the 1920s! Women started driving, smoking, swearing, and cutting their hair short like men -- take that, you dinosaurs! Jazz and later swing were just as much of a middle finger to older people as rock and roll was later on -- perhaps more so, given how much jazz broke with other forms of popular and classical music that formed the cultural background. Rock and roll, compared to its background, wasn't so different. One central way by which young people mark themselves off from older people is by inventing their own slang, and they indeed made a bunch of it in the 1920s, much of which is still with us today.

After WWII and through the first half of the 1960s -- the Golden Age of American Capitalism -- the level dips below the historical trend. The name "Silent Generation" was coined in 1951 to refer to young people at the time, and silent they were. If we must use "generation" instead of cohort, I prefer using distinct names for what I've been calling Generations -- Boomers, X-ers, etc. -- and numbered Silent Generations for everyone else (i.e., Silent Generation 1, 2, 3, ...). Of course, after them come the Baby Boomers, although surprisingly the late '60s level is not so far above the historical trend. Still, in absolute terms, it's as high as it was during the 1920s, even if it doesn't last as long.

There is a dip below trend for most of the 1980s, when Silent Generation 2 was in college. Then there's a spike in the early 1990s, reflecting Generation X finding its megaphone, to everyone's annoyance. It's hard to make out the end -- it looks mostly at the historical trend, perhaps with a recent jump. Sometime in the middle of the next decade, we'll be hit by another wave of social hysteria, and that will crystallize the young people then (say, age 16 to 24) into a new generation. We already have a name for them -- the Millennials -- but their generational self-awareness doesn't seem very deep to me right now. Voting for Obama has been the extent of them making us hear the voice of a new generation. But just wait.

I'm not too sure what causes the increasing historical trend -- maybe it just shows that the word is becoming more and more common to describe something we already talked about before, and hence the trend isn't interesting. Or it could mean that with an increasing pace of cultural change, we are able to pay better attention to generational changes, and we can therefore talk about them a lot more than before.

What's really interesting are the oscillations above and below the trend, which correspond pretty well to what we consider the heydays of Generations and Silent Generations, respectively. Trying to piece it all together, I think that generational awareness is low when times are prosperous and young people are small as a fraction of the population. This combination of good economic times and little competition means they can more easily establish themselves during early adulthood on their own. They don't feel gipped or embittered, so they aren't anti-establishment (which in practice means anti-elders). In contrast, when economic times are bad and there are a lot of young people competing to establish themselves, anxiety about the future sets in, many feel cheated -- they went to college and didn't end up making it rich -- and they have to band together to support each other.

This is really just a rough guess, and I don't have good data to present on the percent of the population that's 16 to 24, or what their average wages were, over this entire time period. And there are exceptions, of course. But looking at the whole thing, that's what I see.

Next update: religion, which will cover five topics and include a composite index.